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Note
The Most Integrated Setting: Olmstead, Fry, and
Segregated Public Schools for Students with
Disabilities
Trevor Matthews∗
The State of Georgia operates a network of schools for students with disabilities called the Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS). 1 GNETS purports to
“provide comprehensive educational and therapeutic support
services to students who might otherwise require residential or
other more restrictive placements.” 2 However, the GNETS program also segregates students with disabilities from their peers
without disabilities in inferior school buildings with inferior educational services. 3 In fact, some GNETS school buildings were
originally used as schools for African American students during

∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like
to thank Sean Burke, Maren Hulden, and Dan Stewart at the Minnesota Disability Law Center for their advice, guidance, and support. I am also grateful to
the staff and editors of Minnesota Law Review for their dedicated labor in preparing the piece for publication. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Tara
Hill Matthews, for inspiring me to write about inclusion and segregation, and
for the long hours she spent editing this Note with me. I could not have written
this without her. Copyright © 2018 by Trevor Matthews.
1. See Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support, GA.
DEP’T EDUC., http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/
Special-Education-Services/Pages/Georgia-Network-for-Special-Education-and
-Supports.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). As of November 30, 2017, the program is still in operation. Id.
2. Id.
3. Alan Judd, Georgia “Psychoeducational” Students Segregated by Disability, Race, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://specials.myajc.com/
psychoeducation/; see also Timothy Pratt, The Separate, Unequal Education of
Students with Special Needs, HECHINGER REP. (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www
.hechingerreport.org/georgia-program-children-disabilities-separate-unequal
-education.
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de jure segregation. 4 As if that particular irony were not enough,
GNETS students are also disproportionately African American. 5
Students in GNETS schools also have unequal access to extracurricular activities and “do not have any opportunity to participate in art, music, foreign language, vocational courses, . . .
honors courses, or other electives. To the extent that GNETS
programs offer elective courses, they are generally limited exclusively to computer-based courses,” which offer no interpersonal
interaction. 6 Investigations revealed that some GNETS schools
required students to undergo psychological experiments 7, and
that students at one GNETS school, Fitzhugh Lee, had been restrained with dog leashes. 8
In 2016, the Department of Justice initiated a novel lawsuit
against the State of Georgia, alleging that the GNETS program’s
segregation and inferior services violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 9 without alleging any violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 10 In its prayer
for relief, the complaint asks that Georgia be required to
“[p]rovide appropriate, integrated mental health and therapeutic educational services and supports that are designed to allow
students with behavior-related disabilities to be placed in integrated general education classroom settings, and access to equal
4. Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Letter of Findings on United
States’ Investigation of the Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic
Support, D.J. No. 169-19-71, 3 (July 15, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/
documents/gnets_lof.pdf [hereinafter Letter of Findings].
5. Judd, supra note 3. In fact, African American children are disproportionately placed in special education across the country. See NAT’L ALL. OF
BLACK SCH. EDUCATORS ET AL., ADDRESSING OVER-REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 5 (2002).
6. Letter of Findings, supra note 4, at 15.
7. Judd, supra note 3. For a description of one such proposed test, see infra
Part II.A.
8. Alan Judd, In Psychoeducational School, Behavioral Experiment for
Troubled Child, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 5, 2016), https://specials.myajc.com/
psychoedexperiment/.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012); see Complaint ¶ 1, United States v.
Georgia, No. 1:16-cv-03088 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
crt/file/887356/download [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint]. As of
this writing, the State has closed a number of GNETS schools, but has also
moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that the Department of Justice lacks standing. Alan Judd, States’ Rights? Georgia Seeks To Dismiss Federal Suit over
Schools for Disabled Students, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 2, 2016), http://
investigations.blog.ajc.com/2016/11/02/states-rights-georgia-seeks-to-dismiss
-federal-suit-over-schools-for-disabled-students.
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educational opportunities, to those in or at serious risk of entering the GNETS Program.” 11
The story of GNETS and the lawsuit it has spawned are emblematic of countless other stories of segregation, abuse, restraint, and seclusion that drive litigation designed to protect
the rights of persons with disabilities across the United States.
These suits, commonly referred to as “Olmstead litigation” after
the landmark Supreme Court Case, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 12 rely on Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 13
and its implementing regulations 14 to assert that government
programs are failing to “provide community-based treatment for
persons with mental disabilities” even though “such [treatment]
is appropriate.” 15
Olmstead litigation has helped litigants with disabilities
successfully sue, inter alia, prisons,16 sheltered workshops, 17
hospitals and treatment facilities, 18 and residential facilities 19 to

11. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10, at 26.
12. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134.
14. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2017).
15. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
16. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (holding that
“the plain text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously extends to state prison
inmates”).
17. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 602 (D. Or. 2012). In Lane v.
Kitzhaber, the District of Oregon certified a class of “‘all individuals in Oregon
with intellectual or developmental disabilities who are in, or who have been
referred to, sheltered workshops’ and ‘who are qualified for supported employment services.’” Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 32–33, Kitzhaber, 283
F.R.D. 587, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST). Class certification is often the same as a victory in class actions, and a settlement agreement was recently announced. Lane
v. Brown Landmark Settlement Agreement Announced, DISABILITY RIGHTS OR.
(Dec. 30, 2015), https://droregon.org/lane-v-brown-settlement. Governor Brown
replaced former-Governor Kitzhaber as named plaintiff in the suit after Kitzhaber ’s resignation in 2015. See id.
18. See, e.g., Day v. District of Columbia, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C.
2012) (permitting an integration claim against nursing facilities to survive multiple dispositive motions).
19. See, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184,
187 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (“ The adult homes at
issue are institutions that segregate residents from the community and impede
residents’ interactions with people who do not have disabilities. DAI has proven
that virtually all of its constituents are qualified to receive services in supported
housing, a far more integrated setting in which individuals with mental illness
live in apartments scattered throughout the community and receive flexible
support services as needed.”).
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obtain better treatment or placement in a different, more agreeable setting. 20
This Note examines the potential for Olmstead to be used to
challenge a form of segregation and isolation that is still common
across the country: segregating children with disabilities in
schools that only serve students with disabilities (“segregatedsite” or “separate-site” schools). 21 In addition, this Note will discuss some of the strategic and doctrinal issues that underpin
such a lawsuit. Part I provides an introduction to the ADA and
its implementing regulations, to Olmstead and its rationale, and
to IDEA, the primary federal special education law. 22 Part II argues that Olmstead and the ADA forbid schools from operating
segregated facilities that only enroll students with disabilities,
rather than placing them in similar classrooms in integrated
schools in their community. 23 Finally, Part III examines the

20. The litigants in Olmstead were placed in an institution against their
will. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 588 (1999). The purpose
of the suit was to obtain a placement in a less restrictive environment. See id.
21. The Department of Education collects a broad set of data on special education in the United States. IDEA Section 618 Data Products: State Level Data
Files, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-data/
state-level-data-files/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Data].
In 2015, 146,581 children ages six through eighteen were in segregated schools
for students with disabilities across the United States and Puerto Rico. See
id. (download 2015 file on Child Count and Educational Environments). The
Department of Education maintains this data in a comma separated
value (CSV) file. See id. A spreadsheet compiling this data is on file with the
author.
22. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
23. This line of reasoning may also raise a potential challenge to segregated
classrooms, which would be an argument in favor of a concept called full-inclusion. Full-inclusion is the idea that all children with disabilities should be included in the general education classroom. See, e.g., Special Education Inclusion, WIS. EDUC. ASS’N COUNCIL, http://www.weac.org/articles/specialedinc
(“Full inclusion means that all students, regardless of handicapping condition
or severity, will be in a regular classroom/program full time. All services must
be taken to the child in that setting.”). Using Olmstead for a full-inclusion lawsuit is more difficult because there is a body of IDEA case law that upholds the
segregated classrooms as a necessity for some students to receive a free appropriate public education. Cf., e.g., Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1993) (“We construe IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement to prohibit a
school from placing a child with disabilities outside of a regular classroom if
educating the child in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support services, can be achieved satisfactorily.”). Despite decades of IDEA-based
litigation, segregated special education classrooms persist across the country.
In addition, full-inclusion is a controversial and fraught topic. See Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 189, 210–14 (providing a discussion of the larger debate around full-inclu-
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most salient defenses and challenges to such a claim: the need
for administrative exhaustion, a state’s ability to rely on the determinations of its own treating professionals, and the fundamental alteration defense. Although the issues surrounding the
interaction of the ADA and IDEA are complicated, students’
right to integration is independently grounded in the ADA, separate from the protections of IDEA.
I. OLMSTEAD AND ITS FOUNDATIONS
The Olmstead decision is, in part, the result of changing societal attitudes about how the state and its citizens can best meet
the needs of persons with disabilities. This Part addresses the
legal underpinnings of Olmstead litigation. Section A provides
an overview of Title II of the ADA, which Olmstead interprets.
Section B provides a brief overview of institutionalization, which
underpins the rationale of Olmstead and much of its progeny.
Section C provides an in-depth overview of Olmstead itself. Finally, Section D offers a basic explanation of IDEA, which has
traditionally been the main vehicle for special education litigation, and a discussion of the material distinctions between the
ADA and IDEA for purposes of the need for Olmstead litigation
in the field of education.
A. TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
INTEGRATION MANDATE
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA,24 “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 25 In passing the
ADA, Congress expressly found that “physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in
all aspects of society,” and that “historically, society has tended
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 26
sion); see also Megan Roberts, Comment, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1055 (2008) (providing another discussion of these tensions). Because of the complexity of the topic
and the limited scope of the subjects covered here, this Note limits its discussion
to challenging separate, segregated sites.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
25. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
26. Id. § 12101(a)(1)–(2).
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For Olmstead claims, the most important provisions of the
ADA are found in part A of Title II. 27 These sections apply to any
“public entity,” which is defined as “any State or local government.” 28 Under § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 29 The text of the Act frames discrimination as an
issue of exclusion, that is, a denial of “benefits.” 30 To prevent this
exclusion, states are required to make “reasonable modifications” to their programs or services that facilitate access. 31
This text itself is remarkably broad, but there are two nuances that are important to grasp. First, Title II of the ADA does
not apply to the federal government—the statute unambiguously references only “State or local government.” 32 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)33 covers the Federal government instead, providing protections from discrimination that
according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), are “at least
equal” to those available under Title II. 34 Therefore, discrimination under color of federal law will implicate different legal provisions than improper action by a state, but will provide functionally the same standards of liability and the same relief.
Disability rights claims are often referred to as ADA or Section
504 litigation with little to distinguish them.35
Second, it is important to understand that the ADA’s protections are to be read broadly. The ADA protects all individuals
with a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
27. Id. §§ 12131–12134.
28. Id. § 12131(1)(A).
29. Id. § 12132.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 12131(2).
32. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2012).
34. The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical Assistance Manual Covering State and Local Government Programs and Services, ADA.GOV,
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018); see also
29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (“It is the policy of the United States that all programs, projects, and activities receiving assistance under this chapter shall be carried out
in a manner consistent with the principles of . . . respect for individual dignity,
personal responsibility, self-determination, and pursuit of meaningful careers,
based on informed choice, of individuals with disabilities . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and Section 504, DISABILITY
RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND, http://www.dredf.org/advocacy/comparison.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2018) (comparing and contrasting IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504).
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one or more major life activities of such individual.” 36 After passage of the ADA, in several cases, the Supreme Court limited the
scope of the phrase “substantially limits,” by requiring a case-bycase determination of disability which included mitigating factors (for example, the effect of glasses for those who have impaired vision). 37 This functionally reduced the number of individuals covered by the ADA. Congress disapproved of the Court’s
decision to narrow the scope of the ADA, and in 2008 it amended
the Act “[t]o restore the intent and protections of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.” 38 These amendments added
§ 12102(4)(A) to the act, which declares that Congress intends
that the “definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 39
The ADA is also broad in its condemnation of segregation.
Section 12134 of the ADA authorizes the Attorney General to
promulgate regulations implementing the ADA.40 Among those
regulations is an important provision found at 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(d), commonly referred to as the “integration mandate”
of Title II. 41 The integration mandate declares that “[a] public
entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 42 This provision enshrines a “broad
view of discrimination.” 43 People with disabilities have a right,
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
37. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553 (holding that “the determination of whether an individual is disabled
should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment”); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)
(requiring those “claiming the Act’s protection, to prove a disability by offering
evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience . . .
is substantial” rather than a per se rule based on specific disabilities).
38. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 1.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008
§ 3(4)(A).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12134.
41. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF
TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. 1,
https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.pdf.
42. General Prohibitions Against Discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)
(2017) (emphasis added).
43. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 624 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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not just to receive services without discrimination based on their
disabilities, but to receive those services in the “most integrated
setting.” 44 The integration mandate equates segregation from
people without disabilities as a form of impermissible discrimination. The definition of disability discrimination enshrined in
the ADA “encompasse[s] disparate treatment among members of
the same protected class” by scrutinizing how the state treats
certain citizens with disabilities in comparison to others.45 For
purposes of the integration mandate, access to the larger community of people without disabilities is the opposite of this segregation.
Despite its breadth, the integration mandate is limited in
one important way, referred to as a “fundamental alteration defense.” 46 The mandate requires states to offer services in the
“most integrated setting,” but these provisions are subject to the
requirement that courts weigh “the resources available to the
State, not only the cost of providing community-based care to the
litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others
with mental disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out
those services equitably.” 47 ADA regulations instruct that, “[a]
public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public
entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 48
B. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS
To understand why Olmstead ended up before the Supreme
Court, it is important to understand a bit of the history of custodial care for people with disabilities in the United States. Likewise, to understand why institutionalization should be opposed,
it is helpful to understand its inefficiency and injustice and inequities. This Section provides a brief outline of Medicaid and its
interactions with institutionalization (which led to Olmstead) as
well as a summary of the problems with segregated, institutional
care as a general matter.
44. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
45. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
47. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.
48. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (emphasis added). For more on the fundamental alteration defense, see infra Part III.C.
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The Olmstead decision resulted, in part, from the enactment
of Medicaid. The Social Security Amendments of 1965 provide
for the administration of Medicaid. 49 Because people with developmental disabilities, debilitating mental health challenges, and
other severe disabilities are often indigent, many persons with
disabilities are Medicaid recipients. The passage of the ADA entitled Medicaid recipients with disabilities to receive Medicaid
services in an integrated setting, which led to lawsuits seeking
integrated services, like Olmstead and its progeny.
Originally, Medicaid provided for the comprehensive longterm care of persons with disabilities exclusively through services offered in institutions—like mental hospitals and nursing
facilities. 50 The exact definition of what constitutes an “institution” is murky, but regulation indicates that they have the effect
of “isolating individuals receiving Medicaid . . . from the broader
community of individuals not receiving Medicaid.” 51 Isolation

49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396, (a), (b), (c), (d) (2012).
50. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 § 1902(a)(13),
79 Stat. 286, 345 (1965) (stating that State plans for medical assistance must
“provide . . . for . . . institutional . . . care”); id. § 1905(a)(1), (4) 79 Stat. at 351
(requiring medical assistance plans to provide “inpatient hospital services” and
“skilled nursing home services”).
Medicaid covers certain inpatient, comprehensive services as institutional benefits. The word “institutional” has several meanings in common use, but a particular meaning in federal Medicaid requirements.
In Medicaid coverage, institutional services refers to specific benefits
authorized in the Social Security Act. These are hospital services, Intermediate Care Facilities for People with Intellectual disability
(ICF/ID), Nursing Facility (NF ), Preadmission Screening & Resident
Review (PASRR), Inpatient Psychiatric Services for Individuals Under
Age 21, and Services for individuals age 65 or older in an institution
for mental diseases. Institutions are residential facilities, and assume
total care of the individuals who are admitted.
Institutional Long Term Care, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/
medicaid/ltss/institutional/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). This shift in
policy is, in part, what led to the decision in Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581. As part of
that ruling the court examined the State of Georgia’s insistence that Medicaid
was designed with a preference for institutional care:
The State urges that, whatever Congress may have stated as its findings in the ADA, the Medicaid statute “reflected a congressional policy
preference for treatment in the institution over treatment in the community.” The State correctly used the past tense. Since 1981, Medicaid
has provided funding for state-run home and community-based care
through a waiver program.
Id. at 601 (citations omitted).
51. Contents of a Request for a Waiver, 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(c)(5)(v) (2017).
Compare 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(c)(5)(i)–(iv) (describing settings that are not home
and community based), with Basis and Purpose, 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (suggesting
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and segregation are the hallmarks of institutionalization, and
they are contrary to the integration mandate.
Of course, deinstitutionalization is not just a goal in itself.
Institutions for people with disabilities have a dark history.52
Though institutions have always given vulnerable populations a
place to live, stories of maltreatment and abuse of people with
mental illnesses, as well as people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, are commonplace even today. 53 Institutions
that Medicaid waiver programs “permit[ ] States to offer, under a waiver of statutory requirements, an array of home and community-based services that an
individual needs to avoid institutionalization”).
52. See generally E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING
AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS (1997) (providing a history of the struggle
for deinstitutionalization).
53. See NORA J. BALADERIAN, ABUSE OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES SPEAK OUT: A REPORT ON THE 2012 NATIONAL SURVEY ON ABUSE OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, SPECTRUM INST. 2 (2013), http://
www.disability-abuse.com/survey/survey-report.pdf (“ The bottom line is that
abuse is prevalent and pervasive, it happens in many ways, and it happens repeatedly to victims with all types of disabilities.”); John Rudolf, Where Mental
Asylums Live On, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
03/opinion/sunday/where-mental-asylums-live-on.html (“ The United States began emptying out its vast asylum system in the 1960s, spurred by scathing reports of abuse and neglect, like a 1946 Life magazine exposé that described
many institutions as ‘little more than concentration camps.’”); see also Abuse
and Exploitation of People with Developmental Disabilities, DISABILITY JUST.,
http://www.disabilityjustice.org/justice-denied/abuse-and-exploitation (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (explaining that people with developmental disabilities are
“are four to ten times more likely to be abused than their peers without disabilities” and are otherwise vulnerable to abuse and mistreatment). For example,
in Minnesota, patients at a state-run program for people with disabilities called
METO, “were being routinely restrained in a prone, face down position and
placed in metal handcuffs and leg hobbles.” STATE OF MINN., OMBUDSMAN FOR
MENTAL HEALTH & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, JUST PLAIN WRONG: EXCESSIVE USE OF RESTRAINTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT STYLE DEVICES ON DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED RESIDENTS AT THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES MINNESOTA EXTENDED TREATMENT PROGRAM (METO) CAMBRIDGE, MN 17 (2008). This abuse was only noticed when one patient’s mother
noticed that her child was coming home with “marks and bruises” around his
wrist, caused by the restraints. Sasha Aslanian, Lawsuit Settled Over Treatment of Disabled Residents in State-Run Institution, MPR NEWS (Dec. 1, 2011),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2011/12/01/lawsuit-settled-state-institution
(providing further information on the “improper and inhumane” treatment of
patients with developmental disabilities at METO, which closed in 2011). This
occurred, despite the recognition nearly sixty years prior that the use of mechanical restraints for the institutionalized mentally ill was morally adverse.
See Statement by Governor Luther W. Youngdahl at the Burning of Restraints
(Oct. 31, 1949), https://mn.gov/mnddc/past/pdf/40s/49/49-SGL-Youngdahl.pdf
(describing an event where people gathered “to destroy the strait-jackets, shackles, and manacles” once used in Anoka State [Mental] Hospital and to decry the
devices as “barbarous”).
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keep people with disabilities out of sight and out of mind while
also perpetuating societal stigmas against those who suffer from
mental health challenges or other disabilities. 54 These drawbacks are not the result of a trade-off. Institutional care is expensive, restrictive, and often has inferior health outcomes for
residents than less restrictive and less costly alternatives. 55 One
intuitive reason that institutional care is so expensive is that it
isolates people with disabilities from friends and family who
would ordinarily aid in their care, forcing the state to pay for
that service.56 The institutionalization of people with disabilities
54. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”,
86 VA. L. REV. 397, 424–25 (2000) (discussing in general the “systematic disadvantage experienced by people with disabilities”); see also id. at 446 (“Individuals with [disabilities] are likely to be deemed outside of the norm for which social
institutions and physical structures are designed. To safeguard their access to
opportunities, they are therefore likely to need the ADA’s protection against
discrimination and its requirement of accommodation.”). This belief that people
with disabilities are not designed for normal society is exactly what permits
segregation in institutions. This stigmatization is expressed in a myriad of other
ways. For example, “In some cases, [people with disabilities] were required by
law to stay at home; as late as 1974, some major American jurisdictions still
maintained ‘ugly laws’ that prohibited ‘unsightly’ people—a category that encompassed people with disabilities—from appearing in public.” Id. at 442 (quoting Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035
n.2 (1987)).
55. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999)
(“[C]ommunity placements cost less than institutional confinements.”). Numbers from states bear this out. See, e.g., Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335
F.3d 1175, 1186 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In Oklahoma, it costs approximately
$28,000 per year to provide care to a disabled individual in a nursing home, and
$14,000 to provide care through the Home and Community Based Waiver program.”); see also Michael J. Berens & Patricia Callahan, A Troubled Transition:
In the Rush to Close Institutions, Illinois Ignored Serious Problems in Group
Homes, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
watchdog/grouphomes/ct-group-home-investigations-cila-met-20161229
-htmlstory.html (“In [Illinois in] 2012, state officials calculated the annual cost
of care for an institutionalized resident was about $219,000, compared with
$84,000 at a group home.”).
56. Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: “Most Integrated Setting Appropriate” Requirements and the Independent Living Model of
Long-term Care, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 17, 18 (2001) (describing how “informal
caregivers in 1997, provid[ed] the economic value of $196 billion in uncompensated services”). This is not to say that those caregivers should necessarily remain unpaid. One waiver program in Minnesota, called Consumer Directed
Community Supports, permits waiver recipients to hire and pay their own caregivers, including friends and family. See MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., CONSUMER DIRECTED COMMUNITY SUPPORTS CONSUMER HANDBOOK 10 (“ The person or persons you hire could be immediate family members, friends, neighbors
or coworkers.”). See generally Consumer Directed Community Supports,
MN.GOV, https://mn.gov/dhs/people-we-serve/people-with-disabilities/services/
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is not limited to residential settings. For example, many adults
with intellectual disabilities spend their working hours in segregated workshops 57 and, as will be discussed further below, many
students with disabilities are placed in separate, segregated educational settings. 58 In passing the ADA, Congress also found
that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 59
Critics of institutionalization note that people with disabilities experience isolation and discontent, 60 and that that disability integration results in prosocial outcomes. 61 The congressional
findings that accompany the ADA in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)
demonstrate that Congress considered these problems in passing the law. 62 Congress declared that isolation, segregation, and
institutionalization are a “serious and pervasive social problem,”
that “census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally,” and
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on

home-community/programs-and-services/cdcs.jsp (last visited Jan. 30, 2018)
(providing information on the Consumer Directed Community Supports program).
57. Laura C. Hoffman, An Employment Opportunity or a Discrimination
Dilemma?: Sheltered Workshops and the Employment of the Disabled, 16 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 151, 153 (2013) (providing a brief history and overview of
sheltered workshops in the United States).
58. See Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=59 (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (indicating that 13.8% of
students with disabilities spend “less than 40%” of their educational time in
integrated general education classrooms and providing other similar statistics).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2012).
60. See, e.g., NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SEGREGATED & EXPLOITED: THE FAILURE OF THE DISABILITY SERVICE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE QUALITY WORK 8 (2011), http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/
Publications/Reports/Segregated-and-Exploited.pdf (“Segregated work facilitates feelings of isolation for many people and impinges on the natural desire to
connect with others. Sheltered workshops have replaced institutions in many
states as the new warehousing system and are the new favored locations where
people with disabilities are sent to occupy their days.”).
61. See, e.g., Donna Kam Pun Wong, Do Contacts Make a Difference? The
Effects of Mainstreaming on Student Attitudes Toward People with Disabilities,
29 RES. DEV. DISABILITIES 70, 71–73 (2008) (providing a literature review indicating that “[s]ocial contact with peers with disabilities is considered to be a key
variable in shaping [positive] attitudes” toward disability).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
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an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. 63

As will be shown in Section C, Olmstead is proof that the ADA
provides for the legal redress of these wrongs.
C. OLMSTEAD V. L.C. EX REL. ZIMRING
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court examined the plight of two institutionalized women, L.C. and
E.W., 64 who each had developmental disabilities and mental
health issues. 65 In 1992 and 1995 respectively, L.C. and E.W.
were admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta for psychiatric treatment. 66 In both cases, treating physicians determined that the women could be appropriately treated in a noninstitutional, community-based setting, but they remained
institutionalized for a long period of time after that determination had been made. 67 In May 1995, three years after her original
institutionalization at Georgia Regional Hospital, L.C. filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, arguing that her segregated confinement violated Title
II of the ADA and the integration mandate. 68 E.W. intervened
and alleged the same claims. 69
The nub of the dispute in Olmstead was whether, given Title
II of the ADA and the integration mandate, “undue institutionalization qualifies as discrimination by reason of . . . disability” 70
such that the State of Georgia could be sued pursuant to

63. Id. § 12101(2), (6), (8).
64. Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson are the full names of these women. David
G. Savage, ADA Umbrella Starting To Close Multiple Rulings Say Act Does Not
Cover Those with Correctable Impairments, 85 ABA J., Aug. 1999, at 44. Consistent with the text of the Olmstead decision, I will use their initials throughout.
65. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 593–94.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 597–98.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 71 to require the state to cease violating Title II. 72 Put another way, the court asked “whether the [ADA’s]
proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons
with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in
institutions.” 73 The Court held that “[u]njustified isolation . . . is
properly regarded as discrimination based on disability,” 74 subject to three considerations: (1) the fitness of the person for a
noninstitutional placement; (2) the state’s commitment to provide treatment for other people with disabilities; and (3) whether
the person desires to be deinstitutionalized.75 The Court concluded:
under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide communitybased treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s
treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate,
the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities. 76

The Olmstead decision was a “defining moment.” 77 The Court’s
holding opened the door wide for people in institutions and their
advocates to sue and seek services integrated into the community under Title II. Relying on the strength of Olmstead, advocates have won victories for broad classes of people from AIDS
patients in New York 78 to segregated workers in Oregon.79

71. The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
72. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597–98.
73. Id. at 587.
74. Id. at 597.
75. Id. at 607.
76. Id.
77. David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services,
26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 770 (2010). Ferleger is critical of Olmstead for various
reasons, largely because of the caveats employed by Justice Ginsburg to limit
the scope of the ruling. See id. at 771–78. Yet, even as a critic of the decision, he
does not diminish the importance of its holding. See id. at 771.
78. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
79. Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 590 (D. Or. 2012).
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D. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Having covered the ADA, it is now time to turn to its educational analogue, IDEA. Though the ADA and IDEA are both expressly intended to protect the rights of people with disabilities,
they are distinct—both in the level of protection they provide and
in the standards that govern their enforcement. This Section
provides an overview of IDEA. Subsection 1 outlines the structure and design of IDEA and Subsection 2 discusses the salient
distinctions between it and the ADA.
1. Understanding IDEA’s Statutory Mandates
IDEA 80 is the primary federal statute governing special education.81 It was originally passed as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 82 and now exists in its current form as a
result of a number of amendments. 83
IDEA was passed to guarantee students with disabilities the
right to a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE). 84 This
guarantee imposes a number of duties on the public schools of a
state, including not only provision of a FAPE, but the duty to
find all children with disabilities within their boundaries (Child
Find) 85 and provide them with individualized services called an

80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
81. For a general overview of IDEA, see Therese Craparo, Remembering the
“Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 472–92 (2003).
82. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1461 (1976)).
83. See Craparo, supra note 81, at 474–77 (providing a history of IDEA and
its predecessors).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (stating that the law was passed to “ensure that
all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,
and independent living”).
85. The statute provides:
All children with disabilities residing in the State, including children
with disabilities who are homeless children or are wards of the State
and children with disabilities attending private schools, regardless of
the severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special education and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated and a
practical method is developed and implemented to determine which
children with disabilities are currently receiving needed special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
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Individualized Education Program (IEP). 86 An IEP is a document which is assembled by a group of school officials (IEP
team), 87 with input from parents and—as appropriate—the student, designed to provide each child with educational services
adapted to meet individual needs. 88 An IEP contains, inter alia:
a description of the child’s present academic performance; goals;
current progress; required services and supports; individual accommodations; and a specific description of how the program will
be administered. 89 States delegate Child Find and IEP duties to
school districts or other such organizations, which IDEA refers
to as Local Educational Agencies (LEA or LEAs).90
Under IDEA, a FAPE must
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary
school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) [be]
provided in conformity with the individualized education program. 91

In addition, a FAPE must “to the maximum extent appropriate”
be provided in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). 92 The
baseline LRE is defined as the general education classroom.93
The LRE requirement demonstrates “‘IDEA’s strong preference
for “mainstreaming,” or educating children with disabilities “[t]o
the maximum extent appropriate” alongside their non-disabled
peers.’” 94
The decision of where to educate a child with an IEP “[i]s
made by a group of persons, including the parents, and other
persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data, and the placement options.” 95 However, parents do
not have the final say; 20 U.S.C. § 1415 establishes grievance

86. Id. § 1412(a)(4) (“An individualized education program . . . is developed,
reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability.”).
87. See 34 C.F.R. § 330.321 (2017) (describing the makeup of an IEP team).
88. See Contents of the IEP, CTR. FOR PARENT INFO. & RES. (Sept. 2010),
http://www.parentcenterhub.org/iepcontents.
89. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (listing the specific requirements of an
IEP).
90. LEA are defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19).
91. Id. § 1401(9).
92. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
93. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (2017).
94. M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007)).
95. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a)(1).
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procedures for parents who are dissatisfied with a LEA’s handling of their child’s education. 96 Before a lawsuit can be filed to
vindicate a student’s rights under IDEA, they must first exhaust
the administrative remedies available under the statute.97
Despite IDEA’s strong preference for mainstreaming and instruction in the general education classroom, IDEA’s definition
of a FAPE carries a weaker integration requirement than the
ADA. 98 It is arguable that the LRE requirement is akin to the
integration mandate, in that the LRE regulation asserts that
students should be placed in the general education classroom to
“the maximum extent appropriate” 99 and the integration mandate uses the phrase “most integrated setting appropriate.” 100
On the other hand, IDEA’s text explicitly discusses “separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment.” 101 IDEA case law also holds
that the Act allows for segregated settings. 102
2. Distinguishing IDEA and the ADA
Where Olmstead’s holding is that the ADA provides broad
protections, the major Supreme Court case interpreting IDEA is
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
97. See id. § 1415(l) (requiring exhaustion of the due process hearing and
appeal under §§ 1415(f ) and (g) prior to filing suit). The exhaustion requirement
is discussed in more detail at infra Part III.A.
98. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.17; see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (explaining that students with disabilities should be integrated with their peers without disabilities
“to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person . . .
[and a] recipient shall place a handicapped person in the regular educational
environment operated by the recipient unless it is demonstrated by the recipient
that the education of the person in the regular environment with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (emphasis
added)).
99. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34.
100. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2017).
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
102. See, e.g., Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th
Cir. 1983) (“In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the
court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. . . . [S]ome handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated facilities . . . .”). For a
review of the differing approaches of the circuits to the LRE requirement and
IDEA compliance, see generally, Angela Estrella-Lemus, An IDEA for Special
Education: Why the IDEA Should Have Primacy over the ADA in Adjudicating
Education Claims for Students with Disabilities, 34 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 405, 440–42 (2014); Megan Roberts, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1059–72
(2008).
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narrow. In Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley, the Court set a low standard for determining whether a LEA is meeting the FAPE requirements of
IDEA. 103 In Rowley, the Court was asked to determine if a LEA
was providing a FAPE to a young deaf girl, where she was performing well in comparison to her peers, but below her own potential due to the classroom environment in which she was being
educated. 104 The Court asked first if defendants had complied
with IDEA’s procedural requirements, and then inquired
whether “the individualized educational program developed
through the Act’s procedures [was] reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits” and nothing
more. 105 After Rowley, the decisions of the IEP team need only
provide “an appropriate education,” not one “that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents,” or
one that helps the child reach their full potential. 106
Though Rowley does not interpret the LRE provisions of
IDEA, the low standard it set has nonetheless had an effect on
how the circuits have interpreted the LRE requirement:
It is well settled that the LRE mandate does not require school districts
to place students in their neighborhood schools in all situations. For
financial reasons most school districts centralize many special education services. In the overwhelming majority of lawsuits in which a parent contests a placement in a school other than the neighborhood
school, the courts have found that the student’s IEP required the centralized placement. 107

103. See 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982).
104. Id. at 184–85.
105. Id. at 206–07.
106. Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Free Union Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir.
1989)). The “loving parents” language is frequently used by courts in IDEA
cases. See, e.g., Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. D.B. ex rel. G.S.B., No. 1:14-CV-02794RWS, 2015 WL 5691136, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2015); J.R. ex rel. W.R. v.
Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., No. 062136, 2008 WL 682595, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2008), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. J.R. v. Sylvan Union
Sch. Dist., No. 06-2136, 2008 WL 2345103 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2008); P.J. By &
Through W.J. v. Conn. Bd. of Educ., 788 F. Supp. 673, 679 (D. Conn. 1992);
Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
107. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered Inclusion Over?,
114 ED. L. REP. 1011, 1012 (1997). Osborne’s article provides a useful discussion
of competing standards for interpreting LRE requirements. Id. at 1015–25. The
article is somewhat old, but the leading cases on LRE that it discusses remain
good law.
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The result of these interpretations is a powerful law that, as will
be shown in Part II below, still seems to permit schools to segregate students from their peers without disabilities in separate
school buildings.
II. INTEGRATION CHALLENGES TO SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
Throughout the United States, state and local governments
run special education programs for students that segregate students with disabilities into separate schools.108 According to statistics published by the U.S. Department of Education in 2015,
across the United States and Puerto Rico, 146,581 students with
disabilities ages six to eighteen attended separate, segregatedsite school buildings. 109 This Part will examine a surprisingly
unexplored frontier in Olmstead litigation: applying the ADA integration mandate to educational segregation of students with
disabilities. First, Section A explains that even though IDEA
provides individual students with disabilities a substantive right
to a FAPE, 110 that right has traditionally been interpreted to offer few remedies for students who end up placed in educational
settings that they do not prefer. Section B will provide an overview of the two cases that have argued that segregated-site
schools violate Title II of the ADA. It will then provide a summary of the argument that students who are displeased with
their segregated educational placements can bring actions under
Title II of the ADA, seeking to receive their educational services
in the most integrated setting.
A. IDEA AND SEGREGATED EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENTS
Though IDEA protects many rights of students, it does not
explicitly protect their rights to receive services in an integrated

108. See, e.g., Emma Brown, Justice Department Sues Georgia Over Segregation of Students with Disabilities, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/08/23/justice-department-sues
-georgia-over-segregation-of-students-with-disabilities/?utm_term=
75f7fd223abd (describing how GNETS segregates students with disabilities into
separate school buildings).
109. See Data, supra note 21. The state of Georgia, where the GNETS program described in the introduction is located, accounts for only 2607, or 1.78%
of those students. Id.
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(a) (2012).
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environment.111 As described above, aggrieved students and
their families must exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies
prior to filing suits challenging their educational placement. 112
In theory, this is a reasonable requirement:
[i]t prevents courts from interrupting permanently the administrative
process, it allows the agency to apply its specialized expertise to the
problem, it gives the agency an opportunity to correct its own errors, it
ensures that there will be a complete factual record for the court to
review, and it prevents the parties from undermining the agency by
deliberately flouting the administrative process. 113

However, in practice this requirement can completely prevent a
litigant from reaching court. Administrative exhaustion requires
a student to remain in an educational placement that they dislike, while first going through the administrative process itself,
and then while litigating the dispute in court. 114 Students are
much more likely to settle, move away, or move to a charter or
private school than reach the end of such a drawn-out legal process, even when the proposed placement is extremely unfavorable. For example, one student in Georgia, Libby Beem, was aggrieved when the state attempted to move her to GNETS. 115 As
part of that move, the school district tried to require her to undergo a psychological experiment. In the proposed experiment a
school psychologist named Whitmarsh, subjected Libby to great
discomfort.
Whitmarsh alone would sit with Libby three hours a day, for eight to
10 weeks, trying to figure out what might provoke her into an outburst.
Then he would do whatever bothered her.

111. See supra Part I.D. As the statute explains,
to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(A) (emphasis added).
112. See § 1415(l) (laying out IDEA exhaustion requirements).
113. Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction Under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law and Proposals for
Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349, 360–61
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
114. 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2017) (“[U]nless the State or local agency and
the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the complaint
must remain in his or her current educational placement.”).
115. Judd, supra note 8.
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He might make sudden loud noises or tell her she had performed
tasks incorrectly. He might order her to complete assignments in subjects she hated. He might ignore her altogether.
No matter how Libby responded, whether she threw school supplies
or struck herself in the head, Whitmarsh would simply watch, he said
later. A colleague in the next room would take notes on Libby’s reactions. The notes could be used later to develop a treatment plan.
....
. . . Julie Beem[, Libby’s mother,] said that . . . Whitmarsh mentioned his plan to wear protective clothing—“so [Julie] didn’t need to
worry about him.” 116

The Beems disapproved of this unusual treatment plan and went
through an IDEA due process hearing.117 Although the administrative law judge agreed that the state should not force Libby to
undergo the experiment, the judge said the state could nonetheless require her to enter the GNETS program.118 Rather than
face GNETS or continue to court, the Beems put Libby into an
online charter school. 119
This is not an unusual result:
It is well settled that . . . school districts [are not required] to place students in their neighborhood schools in all situations. . . . In the overwhelming majority of lawsuits in which a parent contests a placement
in a school other than the neighborhood school, the courts have found
that the student’s IEP required the centralized placement. 120

As a result, a student with disabilities can end up in a segregated
school, cut off from their nondisabled peers, based on determinations made by a child’s IEP team but without parental approval.
The parents can challenge it using IDEA’s administrative process and ultimately discover that their objection to a segregated
placement has no further recourse under IDEA. This is exactly
what happened with the Beems. 121 However, as the lawsuit filed
against GNETS by the Department of Justice shows, IDEA is not
the only place to turn for a remedy.
B. APPLYING OLMSTEAD TO SEGREGATED SCHOOLS FOR
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
Surprisingly, Olmstead and the ADA have not been applied
to public schools until very recently. As far as can be discerned,
there have been only two attempts. One attempt is the suit filed
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Osborne, Jr., supra note 107.
See Judd, supra note 8.
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by the Department of Justice against the State of Georgia and
GNETS. 122 In that case, the Department explicitly relied on
Olmstead and the ADA without any reference to IDEA. 123 The
case is still pending,124 and it is currently unclear whether the
recent change in presidential administrations will result in any
change in approach to this particular type of civil rights enforcement at the Department of Justice. 125
The Department of Justice complaint is an excellent blueprint for a challenge to segregated-site school placements under
Olmstead and the ADA. Relying substantially on the rationale of
Olmstead, the Department alleged four things that set up an effective claim. First, they alleged that GNETS programs are
“[s]egregated, [i]nstitutional, [s]ettings.” 126 Second, they alleged
that “for over 40 years, the State has operated, administered,
and funded the GNETS Program in mostly segregated settings,
largely to the exclusion of integrated alternatives.” 127 Third,
they argued that GNETS students are “[q]ualified to [r]eceive
[s]ervices in [m]ore [i]ntegrated [s]ettings and [d]o [n]ot [o]ppose
[i]t.” 128 Fourth and finally, they asserted that “[t]he State can
reasonably modify its programs, policies, and services to remedy
these Title II violations and avoid discrimination against students in or at risk of placement in the GNETS Program.” 129 The
course charted by the complaint hews closely to the course
charted by the Olmstead plurality:
[U]nder Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide communitybased treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s
treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate,
the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities. 130

122. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
123. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 1, 65. Count I
alleges that “Defendant has violated and continues to violate the ADA by administering its mental health and therapeutic educational service system in a
manner that fails to serve students in the GNETS Program in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.” Id. ¶ 68.
124. Id.
125. See Pratt, supra note 3.
126. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10, at 12.
127. Id. ¶ 38, at 14.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. ¶ 57, at 21.
130. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
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The second example of a court challenge to segregated-site
schools was in 2015, in S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield. 131
There, a proposed class of plaintiffs with disabilities sued
Springfield Public Schools, asserting that the defendants’ decision to place them in segregated, educationally inferior separate
school facilities, rather than “neighborhood schools” 132 violated
Title II of the ADA. 133 This claim admitted that plaintiffs were
receiving the services mandated by IDEA—a FAPE in the LRE—
and thus relied totally on the integration mandate for the requested relief: placement in a more integrated environment. 134
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Title II, which the court denied. 135 In doing so, the court
relied on a tried and true Olmstead rationale: “Plaintiffs have
alleged that Defendants discriminated against S.S. in violation
of Title II by placing S.S. in a segregated educational environment even though, had he been provided with reasonable accommodations, he could have been placed in a neighborhood
school,” 136 and that “[p]laintiffs have adequately pled that the
exclusion of S.S. from the neighborhood schools was by reason of
his disability.” 137
These two examples illustrate the potential power of the integration mandate in the context of education. When school districts elect to congregate students with disabilities in separatesite schools, they are placing students in a facially less-integrated environment by limiting those students’ ability to interact with their nondisabled peers. Segregated-site schools are,
quite literally, segregated schools. As the preamble to Title II
regulations provides, the most integrated environment is one
that “enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 138 Segregatedsite schools are unquestionably limiting students’ peer groups,
and thus they present a fertile ground for new integration suits.
131. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 146 F. Supp. 3d 414 (D. Mass.
2015).
132. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 318 F.R.D. 210, 214 (D. Mass.
2016) (“‘Neighborhood school’ is a term used in this litigation to refer to elementary and middle schools which primarily enroll students based on their residential address . . . .”).
133. S.S. ex rel. S.Y., 146 F. Supp. 3d at 416.
134. Id. at 425.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B (2017) (addressing § 35.130).
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Even if a court were to consider a segregated classroom to be the
most appropriate setting for a student, having such placements
occur in a school with general education classrooms where the
student has access to his or her nondisabled peers is simply more
integrated than a segregated-site placement. Advocates can and
should identify potential plaintiffs who are displeased with their
separate-site placements and consider instituting litigation to
help those students, at the very least, be integrated into schools
that have both special- and general-education classrooms where
they can seek to have access to the community, like the ADA requires. However, advocates should also be aware of the barriers
to such lawsuits, discussed in Part III below.
III. POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO TITLE II CLAIMS AGAINST
SEGREGATED-SITE SCHOOLS
This Part will examine three potential barriers to Title II
integration mandate claims against segregated-site schools: (1)
administrative exhaustion; (2) states’ power to rely on the reasonable opinions of their reasonable treating professionals; 139
and (3) the fundamental alteration defense.140 Section A will introduce IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and discuss its potential
effect on ADA suits against segregated-site schools, in both the
individual and class action contexts. Then it will examine a
newly decided Supreme Court case, Fry v. Napoleon Community
Schools, 141 to consider potential arguments that IDEA exhaustion does not apply to integration suits against separate-site
schools. Section B will argue that Olmstead’s discussion of reliance on the reasonable opinions of treating professionals should
not pose a bar to integration suits against segregated-site
schools. Finally, Section C will briefly introduce the concept of a
fundamental alteration defense and argue that it is unlikely to
be applicable in this context.
A. EXHAUSTION UNDER IDEA
1. Exhaustion and Its Application to IDEA
Exhaustion is an administrative law doctrine that requires
parties to pursue all available avenues of administrative relief

139. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999).
140. See infra Part III.C.
141. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
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before seeking judicial review. 142 Though exhaustion is a common law doctrine, 143 it is routinely enshrined in statutes as a
prerequisite to suit. 144 There are two major purposes of exhaustion. The first is to tap into the expertise of agencies:
Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature
interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function
efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own
errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience
and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial
review. 145

The second rationale underlying exhaustion is efficiency-driven:
[E]xhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims generally can be resolved
much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency
than in litigation in federal court. In some cases, claims are settled at
the administrative level, and in others, the proceedings before the
agency convince the losing party not to pursue the matter in federal
court. 146

One provision of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), requires exhaustion of administrative remedies available under the statute before filing suit under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or other similar statute if the requested relief is “also available” under
IDEA. 147 One barrier to Title II claims against schools has been
142. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51
(1938) (“[T]he long-settled rule of judicial administration [is] that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted.”).
143. See Exhaustion of Remedies, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“ The doctrine that, if an administrative remedy is provided by statute, a claimant must seek relief first from the administrative body before judicial relief is
available.”).
144. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (providing the exhaustion requirement
codified in the Administrative Procedure Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (“No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.”).
145. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); see also Woodford v. NGO,
548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (“[E]xhaustion protects ‘administrative agency authority.’” (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992))).
146. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89.
147. Section 1415(l) (2012) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.], Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 791 et seq.], or other Federal
laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also
available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f )
and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had
the action been brought under this subchapter.
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courts’ tendencies to read this provision very broadly, requiring
that exhaustion is necessary unless the requested relief could
not be available under IDEA 148 or potentially requiring exhaustion as long as IDEA could offer even de minimis relief. 149 This
means that parties that want to sue separate-site schools alleging violation of the integration mandate could potentially be
forced to face long administrative proceedings which are unlikely
to provide the relief they seek.150 Since IDEA regulations permit
segregation, so long as the facilities are comparable. 151 “If a [federal IDEA funding] recipient . . . operates a facility that is identifiable as being for handicapped persons, the recipient shall ensure that the facility and the services and activities provided
therein are comparable to the other facilities, services, and activities of the recipient.” 152 By the same token, those defending
Title II suits could deflect or delay judicial scrutiny by forcing
administrative process on the plaintiffs.
A notable example of this kind of delay occurred in S.S. ex
rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 153 discussed in Part II above. After
the plaintiffs had survived a motion to dismiss on the merits, the
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on the grounds that
[w]hen a plaintiff brings a suit under a statute other than the IDEA,
exhaustion is still required if the relief sought is also available under
the IDEA. . . .
....

148. See, e.g., Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 623 (6th Cir. 2015),
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (requiring IDEA exhaustion where separate statutory claims are “essentially educational”); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito,
675 F.3d 26, 39 n.5 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Like an IDEA claim, a non-IDEA claim that
seeks relief also available under the IDEA must be exhausted administratively
through the IDEA’s due process hearing procedures before it can be brought in
a civil action in state or federal court.”); S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield,
318 F.R.D. 210, 221 (D. Mass. 2016) (“When a plaintiff brings a suit under a
statute other than the IDEA, exhaustion is still required if the relief sought is
also available under the IDEA . . . .”).
149. See, e.g., Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274
(10th Cir. 2000) (“In essence, the dispositive question generally is whether the
plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s
administrative procedures and remedies. If so, exhaustion of those remedies is
required.” (emphasis added)).
150. This is because, as noted above, courts have not interpreted FAPE requirements to provide an effective integration guarantee. See supra Parts I.D,
II.A.
151. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (rejecting the notion
of “separate but equal” in racially segregated schools).
152. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(c) (2017).
153. 318 F.R.D. 210 (D. Mass. 2016).
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. . . . While Plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate a violation of the
IDEA in order to prevail on their ADA claim, their claim does concern
the delivery of services to students whose educational programs are
governed by IEPs. 154

The S.S. court’s interpretation of § 1415(l) potentially presents a
barrier to Title II suits against segregated-site schools because
educational placement is an essential element of a FAPE, and
therefore could feasibly always be challenged in an IDEA proceeding.155 A strict reading of the IDEA exhaustion requirement
is especially problematic for class action plaintiffs because putting together a class of plaintiffs who must first exhaust their
administrative remedies would make finding and qualifying
class members much harder. In addition, such a requirement
would potentially slow down the entire process, since an influx
of due process hearing requests all at once would likely bog down
the exhaustion process.
2. Exceptions to Exhaustion Doctrines for Class Plaintiffs
Because of the novelty of this kind of litigation, it is not obvious if other courts will require classes to be limited only to parties who have previously exhausted, as happened in S.S. 156
There are persuasive arguments that a court should waive the
exhaustion requirement as to class plaintiffs, provided at least
one named plaintiff exhausts. For example, in the context of Social Security exhaustion, a party must either exhaust or have
been unable to exhaust by the time of the filing of the suit to join
a plaintiff’s class, 157 meaning that some plaintiffs may join the

154. Id. at 221–22.
155. For example, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A) (2012) provides that “[s]chool
personnel may consider any unique circumstances on a case-by-case basis when
determining whether to order a change in placement for a child with a disability
who violates a code of student conduct.” This lays the foundations of student
placement decisions in IDEA and makes any child’s dissatisfaction with her educational placement ostensibly remediable under IDEA.
156. For a discussion of the interaction of statutory exhaustion and class
certification from the lens of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see Elizabeth S.
Hess, Administrative Exhaustion and Class Actions: Rules, Rights, Requirements, Remedies, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act Issue Resolved, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 773, 775 (2003). For a discussion of IDEA class actions generally,
see Mark C. Weber, IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 45 U. TOL. L.
REV. 471, 475 (2014).
157. Hess, supra note 156, at 786 (“For class actions brought under the Social Security Act, membership is limited to claimants who have exhausted their
remedies, as well as those who still had an opportunity to do so when the suit
was filed.”).

1440

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1413

suit without being required to have exhausted administrative
remedies.
In the context of employment law, some courts have examined the purposes of exhaustion requirements to conclude that
requiring class-wide exhaustion under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 158 is actually contrary to the intent behind the creation of a statutory exhaustion requirement. 159 “It would be
wasteful, if not vain, for numerous employees, all with the same
grievance, to have to process many identical complaints with
EEOC. If it is impossible to reach a settlement with one discriminatee, what reason would there be to assume that the next one
would be successful[?]”160 This rationale is arguably applicable
under IDEA as well. If one plaintiff has sought an administrative
remedy and found it unavailable, it is patently inefficient to force
dozens or hundreds of other plaintiffs to pursue the same process. It flies in the face of the rationale of exhaustion, by reducing
efficiency and adding little or no expertise to the process.
The legislative history of IDEA’s predecessor statute, The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 161 also supports
the idea that class plaintiffs are not intended to be required to
exhaust. During floor debates, the Act’s author opined, “Nor is it
intended that the availability of these administrative procedures
be construed so as to require each member of the class to exhaust
such procedures in any class action brought to redress an alleged
violation of the statute.” 162 Legislative history of amendments to
the law also reflects this line of reasoning. In 1985, Senator Paul
Simon opined, “[Section 1415] is also clearly not intended to modify traditional standards used by the courts for determining
when a class action suit can be filed.” 163 Furthermore, some
courts have also reached the conclusion that exhaustion for all

158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012) (requiring plaintiffs to first seek administrative remedies through the EEOC before filing suit).
159. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
160. Id. (quoting Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th
Cir. 1968)).
161. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1461 (1976)).
162. 121 CONG. REC. 37416 (1975) (statement of Sen. A. Harrison Williams).
163. 131 CONG. REC. 21393 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon) (emphasis
added).
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class members is unnecessary, finding that the purposes of exhaustion make class-wide exhaustion unnecessary. 164 Forcing
class plaintiffs to exhaust en masse opens the door for inconsistent rulings, confusion, and an incredible amount of wasted
effort when a court finally hears a class action and ultimately
resolves the case for the entire class. When considering all of
these facts together, there is very little support for the idea that
every class member in an IDEA class action should be forced to
exhaust.
The plaintiffs in S.S. apparently failed to raise these issues,
because the court, in denying certification on exhaustion
grounds specifically noted that
[w]hile [the named plaintiff ] exhausted his administrative remedies
prior to this litigation, Plaintiffs have not limited the proposed class to
include only those who have exhausted their IDEA procedural remedies. Plaintiffs also have not argued that there is an exception to the
exhaustion requirement applicable simply because Plaintiffs have
framed this litigation as a class action, and the court has found no such
exception. . . . 165

Given the analysis above, it is fair to say that the court’s position
on class-wide exhaustion in S.S. was wrong both as a matter of
policy and as a matter of law. However, in view of this ruling,
and the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to raise these issues before
the court, future plaintiffs will do well to be aware of the potential problems IDEA’s exhaustion requirement can cause classlitigants asserting ADA claims and to prepare to meet such challenges with thorough and well-reasoned arguments.
3. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools: Evading IDEA
Exhaustion for Suits Under the ADA
Another way to overcome the IDEA’s exhaustion provision
is to show that it is inapplicable to a suit under Title II of the
ADA and the integration mandate. A recent development in case
law governing IDEA now controls this corner of the legal landscape. On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Fry v.
164. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir.
2002) (“ The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies available under the IDEA is not absolute.”); L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd., 516 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“ To [require exhaustion by all class members] would expose the School Board to potentially inconsistent rulings on their
standard policy, ultimately requiring an eventual resolution of the issue by a
federal district court. Under the facts alleged here, exhaustion by class members
would be needless and futile.”).
165. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 318 F.R.D. 210, 221 (D. Mass.
2016).
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Napoleon Community Schools.166 In Fry, the Supreme Court
clarified the legal standards that govern whether relief sought
on ADA grounds is “also available under” IDEA. 167 This new test
to determine if IDEA exhaustion requirements under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) apply to ADA claims says that, “exhaustion
is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is
something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee—
[a FAPE].” 168 In instituting this test, the Court rejected more
stringent exhaustion standards, like those described above, 169
which, for example, ask if relief is “essentially educational.” 170 In
Fry, the Supreme Court has strengthened the argument that
IDEA exhaustion under § 1415 is unnecessary for a suit based
on Title II and the integration mandate.
In explaining how the standard operates, the Court noted
that the exhaustion requirement hinges on whether a hearing
officer in the IDEA’s administrative process could grant any relief. Thus, the necessity of exhaustion depends on whether the
complaint asserts a denial of a FAPE.171 The Court explained:
Suppose that a parent’s complaint protests a school’s failure to provide
some accommodation for a child with a disability. If that accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, the hearing officer must order relief. But if it is not, he cannot—even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends.
There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to
make the requested accommodation. Indeed, another federal law (like
the ADA or Rehabilitation Act) might require the accommodation on
one of those alternative grounds. . . . But still, the hearing officer cannot provide the requested relief. His role, under the IDEA, is to enforce
the child’s “substantive right” to a FAPE. And that is all. 172

The idea, then, will be for plaintiffs to do as the Department of
Justice did against the State of Georgia and rely only on the text
of the ADA, rather than on any provision in IDEA. 173 However,
it is not quite that simple, because the Court expressly disavowed attempts to merely end run the requirements: “If a law-

166. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 746 (2017).
168. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748.
169. See supra Part III.A.1.
170. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 623 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated,
137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
171. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10.
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suit charges such a denial [of a FAPE], the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing her suit under a statute other
than IDEA.” 174
How does one differentiate between claims for denial of a
FAPE and claims that substantively rely on the ADA? The
Court’s standard asks whether “the plaintiff [could or] could not
get any relief from [IDEA] procedures.” 175 Because part of a
child’s placement is an element of her IEP, 176 simply challenging
a placement is likely relief “also available” under IDEA. 177 However, the Court adds that “[a] school’s conduct toward such a
child [with disabilities]—say, some refusal to make an accommodation—might injure her in ways unrelated to a FAPE.” 178 This
is the key idea. Like the Department of Justice argued in Georgia, plaintiffs who oppose their placement in a segregated-site
school may admit that the school is meeting its baseline FAPE
requirements, but allege that the school placement injures them
on integration grounds. Therefore, they would arguably be “alleg[ing] only disability-based discrimination, without making
any reference to the adequacy of the special education services.” 179
This approach could potentially put plaintiffs seeking to
bring a desegregation claim against a segregated-site school—
without exhausting—in an unusual or even potentially inconsistent position. One way to attempt to avoid the exhaustion requirement is to assert that the separate-site school is successfully providing the student a FAPE, but is still violating the
integration mandate, as the plaintiffs in S.S. did. 180 As a result,
the antiexhaustion argument would assert that the school is
meeting the requirements of IDEA and thus “the plaintiff could
not get any relief from [IDEA’s administrative] procedures.” 181
Of course, this line of reasoning may be antithetical to the goals
of plaintiffs who are both dissatisfied with the quality of education their child is receiving and dissatisfied with the setting in
174. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.
175. Id.
176. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(7) (2017).
177. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012).
178. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.
179. Id. at 758.
180. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 146 F. Supp. 3d 414, 424 (D. Mass.
2015) (“Plaintiffs have acquiesced to its ruling that S.S., even when placed in a
segregated environment exclusively with other students with mental health disabilities, was provided with FAPE in the LRE . . . .”).
181. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.
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which it is offered. On the other hand, IDEA exhaustion is a
lengthy process and is more sympathetic to segregated facilities.182 Therefore, challenging such settings for denial of a FAPE
is not an obviously promising line of attack. Moreover, plaintiffs
who want both IDEA and ADA relief are able to elect to exhaust
if they so choose.
Of course, there are other ways to challenge the exhaustion
requirement, and therefore creativity is powerful. For example,
because IDEA and its implementing regulations require the LRE
rather than simple integration, plaintiffs could rely on the distinction between the idea of a restrictive setting and an integrated setting as the basis for their suit. Plaintiffs may also reasonably argue that the complaint is “a suit brought under a
different statute,” 183 seeking a different remedy, and therefore
“the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit” 184 is to vindicate a right not
offered under IDEA: to receive services in “the most integrated
setting.” 185 Under this approach, finding a way to stress that a
segregated classroom and a segregated school building will offer
functionally equivalent services will be a fact-specific inquiry.
Because LEAs are just that, these comparisons will be necessarily context-specific.
To summarize, plaintiffs seeking to use Title II to challenge
placement in a segregated-site school have a variety of ways to
do it. Individual plaintiffs may elect to seek relief under the administrative process supplied by IDEA before bringing a Title II
integration claim.186 For individual plaintiffs who are unhappy
with their placement, they are likely to have begun the negotiation portion of this process simply as a part of conflicts with a
school district over where education will occur. However, if either class or individual plaintiffs want to evade exhaustion, they
can argue that exhaustion does not apply under Fry because
their claim does not plead a denial of a FAPE.187 In addition,
class plaintiffs can argue that exhaustion by a single plaintiff is
enough to meet the requirements of the Act based on the doctrinal purposes behind exhaustion requirements, the legislative

182. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
183. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.
184. Id. at 748.
185. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2017).
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g) (2012) (detailing IDEA’s administrative hearing
and appeals process).
187. See supra Part II.B.
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history of IDEA’s predecessors, and case law that has upheld this
principle.
B. THE STATE’S ABILITY TO RELY ON THE REASONABLE
ASSESSMENTS OF TREATING PROFESSIONALS
A majority of the court in Olmstead held that “the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual meets the essential eligibility requirements for habilitation in a communitybased program.188 Absent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a patient from the more restrictive setting.” 189 One potential line of defense for a LEA in a Title II suit
is that students’ placement in a separate-site school is the result
of the “reasonable assessments” of its own officials. 190 Therefore,
the argument goes, such determinations are not open to challenge by plaintiffs where there is a properly instituted IEP.
There are three major weaknesses to this argument. The
first is a logical inconsistency; simply comparing a segregated
school building to a separate classroom in an otherwise integrated neighborhood school does not offer much in the way of
difference between placements. Students in either environment
will likely not receive a substantially different classroom experience, nor will they necessarily be subject to a less restrictive regimen in one or the other. Therefore, to the extent that the placement in a segregated-site facility is the result of the opinion of a
treating professional, it is difficult to see how the eligibility requirements would differ between the two settings in a way that
necessitates one placement over the other. This has the potential
to be an evidence-sensitive examination, but to the extent that
the two settings are equivalently restrictive and one is significantly more integrated than the other, there is fertile ground for
an integration mandate claim.

188. “Habilitation services,” according to Medicaid regulation, include “special education and related services.” 42 C.F.R. § 440.180(c)(2)(ii) (2017).
189. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999).
190. Id. Principles of agency seem to suggest that IEP teams would reasonably constitute a state’s “treating professionals” under Olmstead for purposes of
educational placements. Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A) (“ The term ‘local educational agency’ means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of,
or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary
schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision
of a State . . . .”).
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Second, it is not clear that such a placement could be deemed
reasonable.191 Because Title II and its implementing regulations
enshrine a right to receive services “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities,” 192 school districts face a high burden in attempting to
argue that community placement in a nonsegregated school is
inappropriate when most plaintiffs will be living in a community-based residential setting—at home with their parents. In
addition, adult plaintiffs in Olmstead litigation have repeatedly
argued, with success, that their placements in institutions like
hospitals and nursing homes are inappropriate. 193 How can it be
reasonable to place students in segregated, institution-like settings when they already live in an integrated community setting
at home?
This same rationale applies to the daytime activities of people with disabilities as well. A recent case, Lane v. Kitzhaber,
involved a successful Olmstead claim against sheltered workshops which segregate adults with disabilities from the community during working days. 194 Sheltered workshops are an easy
analogue to schools, because schools fill the same part of the day
for children as a workplace does for adults. Under this rationale,
the holding in Lane is more problematic than it would be in the
context of a case about schools. Potentially, sheltered workshops
found to violate the integration mandate would end up being unusable for providing services to people with disabilities. However, because school districts are likely to already have special
191. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603. The reasonable assessments standard has
been described as a “negligence standard.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and
Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37 (2012).
This imposes a duty on states. Would a reasonable treating professional believe
that a segregated school facility was more appropriate than a separate classroom in a neighborhood school?
192. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2017).
193. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 581 (ordering integration for plaintiffs
institutionalized in hospitals); Benjamin v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 1:09-CV1182, 2014 WL 4793736, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) (giving final approval
to a settlement agreement giving residents in Intermediate Care Facilities in
Pennsylvania the right to more integrated placements); Disability Advocates,
Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that certain
“adult homes” in New York “ are institutions that segregate residents from the
community and impede residents’ interactions with people who do not have disabilities.”). See generally Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization:
The Definition of “Institution” and the Future of Olmstead Litigation, 17 TEX. J.
ON C.L. & C.R. 143, 144 (2012) (discussing deinstitutionalization litigation and
its future).
194. 283 F.R.D. 587, 602 (D. Or. 2012).
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education classrooms in neighborhood school buildings, 195
Olmstead claims against school districts should be much less
controversial. A school building is useful to students no matter
who attends it. All that the plaintiffs will be seeking to change
is the demographics of students who attend particular buildings.
By contrast, the sheltered workshops at issue in Lane require
more complex—and potentially fraught—changes to government
programs,196 yet the plaintiffs were still met with success.
Finally, some case law suggests that the reasonable assessments standard imposes a duty on states, but is not itself a defense. For example, in a landmark Olmstead case, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, Judge Garaufis of the Eastern District
of New York wrote, “The court does not read Olmstead as creating a requirement that a plaintiff alleging discrimination under
the ADA must present evidence that he or she has been assessed
by a treatment provider and found eligible to be served in a more
integrated setting.” 197 The result of this holding is that the plaintiffs in Paterson were permitted to affirmatively prove during the
course of litigation that they were eligible for a more integrated
placement. To the extent that such a holding applies in the IEP
context, an IEP itself would be no defense. 198
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION DEFENSE
The fundamental alteration defense holds that the government does not have an absolute duty to limit discrimination by
195. According to U.S. Department of Education data, in 2011 there were
815,525 students in the general education classroom forty percent or less of the
time nationwide. See Data, supra note 21 (download 2011 file on Educational
Environments). The Department defines this category to include, “self-contained special classrooms with full-time special education instruction on a regular school campus.” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., IDEA PART B CHILD COUNT AND EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2014–2015, at 6 (2015), https://
www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-data/collection-documentation/data
-documentation-files/part-b/child-count-and-educational-environment/idea
-partb-childcountandedenvironment-2014.doc.
196. See J. Gardner Armsby, The War on Sheltered Workshops: Will ADA
Title II Discrimination Lawsuits Terminate an Employment Option for Adults
with Disabilities?, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 450–52 (2015) (discussing how
plaintiffs in Lane were met with hostile intervenors who were concerned that
the suit would restrict their ability to work in sheltered workshops by leading
to their closure).
197. 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
198. For further discussion of this subject, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37
(2012) (discussing the “ambiguity” of the effect of “determinations of the state’s
treating professionals” under Olmstead in greater depth).
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modifying its programs. In other words, this defense prevents
litigants from identifying a service they would like to receive
and/or a setting in which they would like to receive it in and suing to compel the state to provide it, whether or not it is a part
of their programs. 199 The implementing regulations of the ADA
say that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 200 As one court put it, “This regulation
acknowledges the States’ interests in preserving the essential
characteristics of their public programs and monitoring public
expenditures.” 201
In addition to preventing plaintiffs from demanding services
not already part of the state’s programs, the fundamental alteration defense permits states to use budgetary constraints as a
defense to integrations suits. “Court[s] must consider, in view of
the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing
community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities, and the
State’s obligation to mete out those services equitably.” 202 Litigants cannot force the state to discriminate against another set
of people with disabilities by demanding a remedy that would
simply change the ratio of funds going to one program or another.
The fundamental alteration defense should not generally be
successful in integration suits involving segregated-site schools.
The reason for this is simple. LEAs are required by law to provide special education services. LEAs also likely provide some
students with special education in classrooms in neighborhood
schools. Given the fact that states are already providing the desired services to some students with disabilities, LEAs will have
a difficult time asserting that changing the educational placements of students with disabilities will fundamentally alter their

199. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1208 (D. Or. 2012)
(describing the “forbidden remedy” of “demand[ing] that defendants provide . . .
a certain standard of care or level of benefits”).
200. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2017).
201. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,
489 (4th Cir. 2005).
202. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999).
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programs and services. Even were a LEA required to stop operating a school building as a segregated-site school, it would likely
still be a feasible location to operate as an integrated school. Requiring LEAs to provide educational services in the “most integrated setting” would not likely fundamentally alter their programs or services.203
CONCLUSION
Eighteen years after Olmstead, the landscape of disability
law has changed drastically. There is a nuanced and thoughtful
body of cases interpreting the decision, and there is a broad array of scholarship devoted to supporting legal innovation. Given
the breadth of the ADA and the power of Olmstead’s holding, it
is remarkable that schools have come under consideration only
recently. Because separate-site schools so obviously segregate
students with disabilities in a setting that is not the most integrated available, advocates can and should bring Title II challenges against such schools in their states.
People with disabilities deserve respect and autonomy.
Olmstead and the ADA are an important vehicle for helping people with disabilities vindicate their rights and open the doors to
independence and integration. Community and mutual respect
are part of the “promise of Olmstead.” 204 That respect cannot develop if kids with disabilities are kept out of sight, and out of
mind. Providing for educational integration is one important
way that the promise of Olmstead can be fulfilled.

203. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
204. See MINN. OLMSTEAD SUBCABINET, PUTTING THE PROMISE OF
OLMSTEAD INTO PRACTICE: MINNESOTA’S OLMSTEAD PLAN 13 (Feb. 2017),
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/olmstead/documents/pub/dhs16_
196300.pdf.

